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The Ecological Paradox: Social and Natural Consequences of the Geographies of 
Animal Health Promotion 
 
 
Abstract 
Drawing on the example of bovine Tuberculosis (bTb), this paper examines the 
geographies of animal health promotion. Using theories from the sociology of health, the 
paper outlines how the spatial practices of animal health promotion have had adverse 
policy consequences – what the paper refers to as an ‘ecological paradox’. Analysis of 
ethnographic interviews with 61 farmers in England and Wales provides a range of 
reasons why farmers do and do not implement biosecurity. Drawing on the concept of 
lay epidemiology and ideas of ‘the candidate’ – that is, the terms by which 
someone/thing is most likely to suffer from a particular illness – the paper shows how 
farmers construct farmers, cattle and badgers as likely to be a candidate for bTb; and 
how aspects of luck and fatalism are significant elements of candidature. These effects 
are traced to a clash of spatial practice within the different knowledge articulated by 
official attempts to promote animal health and farmers’ understandings. In failing to 
consider these cultural understanding of disease, the paper argues that the state’s 
attempts to promote animal health have served to reinforce the explanatory power of 
candidacy and traditional understandings of bTb, thereby overriding attempts to promote 
biosecurity. The resulting negative consequences for badgers, cattle and farmers are 
defined as the ecological paradox.  
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Introduction 
 
According to the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra, 2005a), 
bovine tuberculosis (bTb) is one of the most difficult animal health problems currently 
facing the UK. Present in cattle and badgers, and transferable to humans, attempting to 
control its spread currently costs the UK taxpayer £90million per annum. These attempts 
focus attention on circumventing relations between a range of natural agents: the 
bacteria Mycobacterium bovis, wildlife and cattle. However, the problem of bTb and 
animal health in general is also a social and geographical question. Resolving animal 
health problems has always been a matter of geography. Traditionally, this has involved 
attempts to contain the ‘flow’ and ‘mobility’ of animal disease from place to place within 
the globally connected network of sites of agricultural production (Law, 2006). 
Preventing the pollution of these commodity flows from animals at infected individual 
farms to other agricultural spaces demands the creation and definition of new spaces: 
those which are officially free from disease, and those which are not. Ensuring the 
smooth flow of untainted agricultural commodities within this geography requires a set of 
rules, procedures and practices to standardise and purify global agricultural space from 
the disrupting influence of disease (Donaldson and Wood, 2004; Atkins, 2007; Hinchliffe, 
2007). More commonly, these are referred to as ‘biosecurity’ (see Donaldson, 2008; 
Bingham and Hinchliffe, 2008; Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008; Braun, 2007). Patrolling 
the boundaries of diseased agricultural spaces is therefore a social and cultural concern. 
It depends, for example, on farmers’ motivations to conform to biosecurity regulations; 
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governments to adequately resource regulatory agencies; and the effective practice of 
animal health surveillance mechanisms by veterinarians. 
 
Biosecurity regulations specified by the Office Internationale des Épizooties have sought 
to define and control the spaces of diseased agriculture at a global scale. Increasingly, 
though, governments have focused on encouraging farmers and the agricultural industry 
to take ‘ownership’ of animal disease problems (see Defra, 2005a). In part, this 
emphasis represents a neoliberal turn in the governance of animal health. Firstly, the 
economic cost of dealing with animal health crises has directed governments to find 
ways of relinquishing animal health costs and responsibilities to the agricultural industry. 
Secondly, the state has adopted a role which seeks to encourage farmers to take 
‘ownership’ of animal problems by voluntarily implementing localised forms of 
biosecurity as part of their responsibility towards their livestock. Such attempts, though, 
are underpinned by a further set of social and geographical dimensions. In particular, 
the approaches adopted by the state to promote biosecurity practices reflect specific 
‘spatial practices’ (Lefebvre, 1991) inherent within different styles of knowledge 
advocated by different social groups (Bickerstaff and Simmons, 2004; Enticott, 2001). 
For example, drawing on Thrift’s (1996) typology of knowledge practices based on 
place-specific practical knowledge or abstract knowledge empirically derived and 
applicable to large tracts of space, Bickerstaff and Simmons (2004) suggest that these 
respective knowledges can be referred to as ‘proximate’ and ‘distant’ because of their 
inherent spatialities (Bickerstaff and Simmons, 2004). Such geographies potentially 
have consequences for communicating health risks and motivating behaviour change.  
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The aim of this paper is to show how the spatial aspects of biosecurity knowledges 
impact upon the acceptance and uptake of biosecurity advice by government agencies. 
In particular, it focuses on what I call the ‘ecological paradox’. I derive this term from two 
sources. First, from the ‘ecological fallacy’ (Robinson, 1950) for its warnings about the 
relationship between aggregate data and individual behaviour that are all too familiar for 
geographers (Johnston, 1976; Openshaw, 1984). Here concern has been directed at the 
misdiagnosis of individual behaviour and its resultant consequences for social policy. 
The ecological fallacy is an implicit part of the second concept – that of the ‘prevention 
paradox’ (Rose, 1985, 1992) drawn from the sociology of health. The prevention 
paradox is the result of a specific approach to health promotion known as the ‘population 
approach’. It relies on epidemiological data and the communication of health risk factors 
and ameliorative actions across a large geographical area. In this, the population 
approach contains a distinct geographical style of knowledge, but falls into the traps set 
by the ecological fallacy. The resulting paradox is that whilst health promotion initiatives 
seek to improve health, their ecological fallacies often reinforce behaviours associated 
with poor health (Davison et al, 1991).  
 
Much has been written about the effectiveness of the population approach and its links 
to the prevention paradox within public health, but how these concepts might relate to 
attempts to promote animal health is unclear. Studies of the prevention paradox are 
focussed on humans – its effects are explored in relation to their health and their bodies. 
The ecological fallacy, too, focuses largely on social characteristics, human behaviour 
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and its relationship with social policy. By conflating the ecological fallacy with the 
prevention paradox – the ecological paradox – the aim of this paper is therefore to 
explore how the consequences of different geographical approaches to animal health 
promotion are not just social, but distributed across social and natural populations.  
 
The paper begins by outlining the spatial practices within different approaches to health 
promotion and their potential effects upon public understandings of health. The paper 
then applies these theories to animal health: firstly, it introduces the problem of bovine 
tuberculosis; and secondly, drawing on the concept of lay epidemiology and ideas of ‘the 
candidate’ (Davison et al, 1991) within the sociology of health it shows how farmers 
construct understandings of bovine tuberculosis and biosecurity; how these 
understandings are reinforced by the spatial practice of the population approach; and 
how this approach may result in behavioural changes  not anticipated by policy makers. 
In conclusion, I suggest practical solutions to these problems and argue for greater use 
of social science within the management of animal health problems. 
 
The geographies and consequences of health promotion  
 
The sociology of health and illness has paid particular attention to the ways in which 
health promotion messages are constructed, communicated, understood and acted 
upon by the general public. Within this, Rose’s (1985, 1992) seminal work on health 
promotion contrasts the experiences of ‘sick individuals and sick populations’ and their 
consequences for preventive medicine. Rose argues that a focus on sick individuals 
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leads to a focus on the causes of individual cases, whilst a focus on sick populations is 
concerned with the causes of incidence. Preventive strategies also differ along the same 
lines. Rose suggests that a focus on sick individuals requires a ‘high risk strategy’. This 
approach targets those at higher risk of particular illnesses through, for example, 
medical screening, so as to provide treatment that is relevant to the individual and only 
to those in need. This approach is cost-effective, motivational for both patient and 
physician, but may also find borderline cases for whom appropriate treatment is not 
available. More seriously, Rose argues that the approach ‘does not deal with the root of 
the problem, but seeks to protect those who are vulnerable to it’ (Rose, 1985; 36). As a 
result, by requiring individuals to change their lifestyle contra social norms, it is 
behaviourally inappropriate. As Rose points out: ‘no-one who has attempted any sort of 
health education effort in individuals needs to be told that it is difficult for such people to 
step out of line with their peers’ (Rose, 1985: 37). 
 
For sick populations, an alternative population strategy is required. This seeks to ‘control 
the determinants of incidence, to lower the mean level of risk factors, to shift the whole 
distribution of exposure in a favourable direction…in its modern form it is attempting…to 
alter some of society’s norms of behaviour’ (ibid.). Unlike the high risk approach, it 
targets whole populations using mass communication in an attempt to make health 
interventions behaviourally appropriate. However, a significant drawback is what Rose 
calls the ‘prevention paradox’ – that is ‘a preventive measure which brings much benefit 
to the population offers little to each participating individual’ (Rose, 1985: 38). Citing 
epidemiological data, Rose explains that the generalised prescriptions contained within 
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the population strategy offer just ‘a small benefit to each individual, since most of them 
were going to be alright anyway’ (ibid.). As a result, these strategies are demotivating for 
both patients and physicians: ‘grateful patients are few in preventive medicine, where 
success is marked by a non-event’ (ibid.). 
 
The prevention paradox can be viewed as a form of and a behavioural/medical 
consequence of the ‘ecological fallacy’ (Robinson, 1950): that is, the overuse and 
communication of abstracted data to large populations is not only inaccurate, but likely 
to result in adverse policy consequences. A prime example of this is illustrated by 
Davison et al’s (1989, 1991, 1992; Frankel et al, 1991) work on coronary heart disease. 
Davison et al’s (1991: 6) research highlights the extent to which medical disciplines such 
as aetiology have ‘identifiable counterparts in the thoughts and activities of people 
outside the formal medical community’. One example is that of ‘lay epidemiology’. 
Davison et al (1991: 7) stress the extent to which this form of lay knowledge has much in 
common with its scientific equivalent: ‘individual cases (from personal observation or 
report) of people who are known to have suffered heart disease are purposefully linked 
to other circumstances surrounding the event. From this data, regularities are noted and 
these contribute to the generation of explanatory hypotheses which serve to challenge 
or support suspected aetiological processes’. These ideas are mediated, circulated and 
amplified within popular culture and by communities of place, interest and practice. The 
overall effect is to give ‘coherent form and substance by the use of an overall profile or 
image of the kind of person who tends to suffer from heart trouble. This person is the 
“candidate”’ (ibid.). 
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Davison et al (1991: 8) identify four distinct uses of the idea of candidacy. Firstly, 
candidacy is used as a retrospective explanation; secondly, to predict other peoples’ 
illness and death; thirdly, as a retrospective explanation of one’s own illness; and 
fourthly, as an assessment of one’s own risk from illness or death. In each case, 
candidacy rests on physical appearance, social information and personal information 
(p.11). Social information relates to hereditary factors, geographical factors and 
occupational status. Personal information refers to the individual’s own behaviour, such 
as ‘smoking, eating large amounts (especially of fatty food), or consuming excessive 
amounts of alcohol…[or] whose personal natures tend towards nervousness, excessive 
worry or regular bouts of anger’ (p.12). 
 
The concept of the candidate operates as a cultural ‘mechanism which orders 
experience and observation’ allowing people to make sense of everyday events and ill 
health (Davison et al, 1991: 8). It creates mental and social representations of the type 
of people who are likely to be ill and the behavioural reasons for being so. However, this 
way of understanding health is also recognised to be fallible: ‘not all candidates develop 
the illness’ and/or that ‘deaths occur to people who do not fit any particular candidacy 
profile’ (Davison et al, 1991:14, emphasis in original). One such anomaly recognised by 
Davison et al is the figure of “Uncle Norman” – the person known by many who drank, 
smoked and ate unhealthily until his death at a ripe old age. By contrast, there are those 
“health fanatics” who follow all health advice, yet drop dead in their prime. These 
‘unwarranted survivals’ and ‘unwanted deaths’ are explained through the omnipresence 
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of chance. In this respect, Davison et al argue that the notion of the candidate provides 
a second function of explaining the role of bad luck, chance and randomness of sudden 
events, alongside its first function of predicting illness and assessing risk (cf. Pill and 
Stott, 1982). These anomalies prove to be powerful social imagery in guiding health 
behaviour, reflecting the importance of both locally and culturally derived experiences of 
illness. Inherent within these understandings is a ‘privilege of experience’ (Williams and 
Popay, 1994) which relates to the importance of common-sense, folk ideas and local 
identity in the cultural experience of illness, and which provide a ‘transformative effect’ 
(Hunt and Emslie, 2001: 445) in understanding health risks and determining health-
related behaviour (Enticott, 2003).  
 
The prevention paradox is an inherent part of the candidate system – the motivation to 
change behaviour will be questioned because the provision of general advice leads to ‘a 
situation in which many individuals change their lives to no personal end – they would 
not have had a heart attack anyway’ (Davison et al, 1991: 15). But Davison et al argue 
that the simple health promotion messages responsible for this paradox have two further 
consequences: firstly, because so many other factors are involved in illness causation, 
the number of individuals who survive risky behaviours becomes greater. This happens 
because aspects of lifestyle previously considered ‘normal and safe’ become labelled as 
pathogenic. Secondly, while the number of coronary cases who were not apparently at 
risk diminishes, ‘the cases of the individuals who do all the ‘correct’ healthy things and 
yet still succumb to heart trouble become very well known’ (Davison et al, 1992: 683). 
These ‘unwanted deaths’ are part and parcel of the candidate system. However, the 
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ironic consequence of the population approach to health promotion is therefore ‘that 
these cultural concepts are given more rather than less explanatory power by the 
activities of modern health educators, whose stated goals lie in the opposite direction’ 
(Davison et al, 1991: 16).  
 
By now, it should be clear that the strategies and effects of health promotion are 
inherently geographical. They are based on knowledge collected in different ways which 
leads to the practice of health promotion occurring in and communicated from/to 
different geographical sites. The high-risk strategy involves a more localised and 
situated form of knowledge exchange between doctor and patient within a specified site 
of interaction (e.g. hospital) which may allow for a more contingent and ‘proximate’ 
reasoning of appropriate ameliorative actions (Berg, 1997). The geography of the 
population approach though is quite different: it remains a ‘distant’ technology, 
transmitted from afar and based on geographically general rather than specific 
reasoning, over-riding the local and cultural experience of illness. This appears to be the 
cause of its problems identified by Davison et al: its focus on standardised risk factors 
disconnects individuals from their social context (Popay et al, 1998) thereby highlighting 
the gap between personal experience and scientific explanations of the same reality 
(Gifford, 1986). The significance of lay epidemiology and the candidate system therefore 
presents a challenge to the population approach’s use of simple health messages. It 
provides a framework in which risks are amplified and transformed through their 
communication at local and national scales (Kasperson et al, 1988). The challenge 
 12 
facing health promoters is finding ways of dealing with its impact by paying attention to 
the translation of the cultural and geographical assumptions within their strategies. 
 
The problem of bovine tuberculosis and the rise of biosecurity as a population 
approach to animal health promotion  
 
How might this relate to animal health? To answer that, I now turn to the problem of 
bovine Tuberculosis. Since the late nineteenth Century, bTb has been recognised as a 
serious disease affecting both cattle and human health.. For the purposes of this paper, 
the story starts in 1971 following successful policies of milk pasteurisation and meat 
inspection that had led to the near eradication of the disease (MAFF, 1965. Detailed 
historical accounts of bTb are provided in: Dormandy, 1999; Waddington, 2006). The 
early 1970s witnessed a key event that reignited and reframed the problem of bovine 
tuberculosis. By chance, a bTb infected badger was discovered on a Gloucestershire 
farm in 1971 that had recently suffered from a bTb breakdown. The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) responded to these events with a range of 
badger culling policies after trials had shown a strong statistical association between 
culling badgers and disease levels. However, by the mid 1990s there was concern that 
these policies were not working. In 1996 a scientific policy review was commissioned to 
propose solutions based on “sound science” (Krebs, 1997). The resulting report 
established a series of scientific badger culling trials to establish its effectiveness in 
controlling bTb. The Independent Scientific Group (ISG) chaired by John Bourne was 
established to run the culling trials between 1998 – 2005 but its final conclusions 
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suggested that ‘badger culling can make no meaningful contribution to cattle TB control 
in Britain’ (ISG, 2007: 5). Although the ISG recognised badgers to play a significant role 
in transmitting bTb to cattle, their conclusion was based on the significance of badger 
‘perturbation’ following culling events. That is, the ISG argued that incomplete badger 
culling disrupts badgers social groups and territories, resulting in the remaining badgers 
migrating and spreading bTb because of increased contact with infected badgers 
(Woodroffe et al, 2006). Instead, the ISG recommended tighter controls on cattle 
movements, greater use of better diagnostic tools and enhanced on-farm biosecurity 
(ISG, 2007). Defra also instigated a system of pre-movement testing to confirm cattle 
were bTb-free before they could be moved (e.g. to market). Agricultural interests 
nevertheless continued to call for badger culling as a means of eradicating the disease 
(EFRA, 2006).  
 
Calls for more on-farm biosecurity represented a new approach. Traditionally, cattle 
were tested for bTb using an intradermal tuberculin injection (known as the ‘skin test’). 
Cattle that reacted to the test were slaughtered and cattle movement restrictions 
imposed upon the whole farm until subsequent tests proved the absence of bTb within 
the herd. However, as research revealed the limited contribution that badger culling 
made to the disease, greater calls were made for ‘enhanced on farm cattle and wildlife 
biosecurity’ (ISG, 2006: 6). Firstly, this view was supported by research that revealed 
that badgers infected with TB were likely to forage for food in cow sheds at night, 
urinating and defecating upon silage and other food sources (Garnett et al, 2002, 2003). 
Farmers were exhorted to do more to prevent badgers from entering their cattle sheds 
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and feed stores and to fence off pasture from badgers by government ministers who 
claimed that some farms had ‘absolutely no bio-security whatsoever’ (EFRA, 2004: 13). 
Support for these arguments came from politicians within the government’s agricultural 
select committees (SCA, 1999; EFRA, 2004), scientists and badger protection groups. 
Thus, by 2004, improved biosecurity and husbandry were therefore seen as key 
weapons in the fight against bTb by scientists, politicians and conservation groups (for a 
more detailed account see Enticott, 2008). 
 
Some of this biosecurity advice was already in the public domain but was overshadowed 
by the debate over badger culling. In responding to these new calls, Defra sought to 
promote the role of biosecurity by relying on a population strategy. Government 
sponsored biosecurity advice identified general risk factors and communicated them to 
farmers through various media. For bTb, this occurred through a series of leaflets aimed 
at farmers. Firstly, the ‘TB in your herd: reducing the risk’ booklet was produced by the 
Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food in 1999.  This focused on two risks that 
farmers could deal with: minimising cattle to cattle spread; and minimising wildlife 
contacts. In 2006, this advice was updated following new research which suggested that 
the previous advice was in fact wrong. New guidance leaflets focussed on three main 
risks: keeping badgers away from stored cattle feed; making farmyards less attractive to 
badgers; and grazing on high risk areas of pasture (e.g. badger latrines) (Defra 
2007a,b).  
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General biosecurity messages were also communicated to farmers through other 
leaflets. These invariably focussed on the role of cleanliness and disinfectant as a 
means of reducing risk and the statutory cleansing requirements for vehicles at animal 
gatherings (Defra, 2005b). Other leaflets by MAFF (undated) and Defra (undated) 
highlight the need to regularly clean and disinfectant buildings and equipment; have 
pressure washers, brushes, water and disinfectant available; and make sure visitors use 
clean overalls and footwear before and after handling cattle. Farmers are also 
encouraged to keep livestock away from freshly spread slurry; fence off streams and 
rivers; and ensure a clean supply of fresh drinking water in troughs.  
 
In providing this advice, the effect of all these leaflets is to attempt to create an image of 
a particular style of farming that reduces the risk of succumbing to a bTb breakdown. In 
other words, whereas the population approach in human health relies on cultural 
changes in lifestyle, the population approach to animal health attempts an important 
transformation within farming styles. Vanclay (2004) and Silvasti (2003) suggest that 
cultural styles of farming play an important role in guiding and constraining farmers’ 
decision making processes and encouraging the adoption of new styles is extremely 
difficult. It is likely that the promotion of biosecurity faces the same challenges, 
particularly where social research has not been used to identify appropriate agricultural 
extension messages (Vanclay, 2004). 
 
These are not the only ways in which advice is communicated to farmers, but it is the 
main way by which the state has sought to publicly communicate this advice. However, 
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it is also likely that general biosecurity advice is passed on by other actors, including: 
veterinary practitioners, trading standards officers, social networks and the farming 
press. Moreover, the high-profile debate about bTb has meant that biosecurity has also 
been promoted by scientists, politicians and policy makers, and stakeholders within 
various media. The Badger Trust (2007), for example have argued that electric fencing 
around farms may provide greater benefits than culling badgers. These activities may be 
seen as forms of dissemination to popularise specific scientific results (Hilgartner, 1990) 
similar in style to the population approach.  
 
Biosecurity and candidacy: explaining farmers’ understandings of bovine 
tuberculosis and biosecurity 
 
The lesson of the prevention paradox suggests that care needs to be taken when using 
a population approach to manage and promote animal health. The remainder of this 
paper attempts to show the extent to which these lessons apply to the communication of 
bTb biosecurity advice. Firstly, methodological details are provided; secondly, I explore 
farmers’ understandings of bTb and biosecurity; and thirdly, I show the social and 
natural consequences of the ‘ecological paradox’ inherent to the population approach to 
biosecurity. 
 
Methodology  
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Data are drawn from 61 in-depth interviews with farmers in England and Wales 
conducted during 2006 and 2007. Fieldwork was undertaken in two case study areas 
(Devon and Monmouthshire), chosen as examples of areas at high risk from bTb – 
farms within these areas are required by Animal Health to regularly test for bTb1. These 
areas allowed access to farmers with experience of dealing with endemic animal 
disease. Farmers were selected according to purposive criteria, including: those farms 
under bTb restrictions; farms with new cases of bTb; farms that had always been clear 
from bTb; and farms that had implemented forms of biosecurity. This data are not freely 
available: research participants were therefore identified with the help of local vets, other 
agricultural gatekeepers, and social networks. To limit the possibilities of bias, the 
sample was also supplemented by contacting other farmers according to other criteria, 
including: farm type; and geographical location. In Devon, 30 farmers participated in the 
research, and 26 were drawn from Monmouthshire. The sample was supplemented with 
a further 5 farmers from farmers in a third region (Gloucestershire – also a high risk 
area) who had adopted unique biosecurity solutions. In total, 28 farms were suffering 
from bTb at the time of the research, whilst 53 had suffered it in the past. All interviews 
were semi-structured, recorded and transcribed. Participants were assured of 
confidentiality and anonymity at all stages of the research. Interview data were also 
supplemented with other ethnographic data from conversations and participant 
observation with farmers at markets and abattoirs and during farm tours and bTb tests. 
These observations were recorded in a field diary. Analysis of all data was achieved 
using the qualitative data analysis software Nvivo. 
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Candidates for bTb 
 
Farmers use the candidate system to explain animal health in a similar way to which it is 
used to explain human health. They create candidates (of farmers, cows and badgers) 
by themselves and within their own cultural environment. Thus, stories of bTb 
candidates circulate around farming communities, creating and perpetuating beliefs 
about bTb. Firstly, farmers use the candidate system to retrospectively explain why they 
or their neighbours have suffered a bTb breakdown. Farmers might explain their bTb 
breakdowns on the use of risky practices that contravene government biosecurity 
advice, such as placing cattle feed on the ground or leaving mineral blocks in fields. In 
doing so farmers mobilise an image of a poor farmer whose practices inevitably lead to 
bTb: 
“I don’t feed animals on the ground because I know of another farmer that fed all 
his animals – his young stock – whilst they were out…and he trough fed them, 
not on the ground but he did trough feed them and he saw badgers trotting over 
to clear up what the cows had left so and probably cough in the trough and that’s 
that!” 
 
“There's a guy back here … it's a chap that has rented it for the summer, the silly 
sod was feeding nuts out into the autumn, we could see the badgers going there 
and sure enough he has gone down and that's where he picked it up from 
because he's feeding out there which is a worry because it now means we have 
got it back down here”  
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Farmers may also refer to cattle factors to explain their bTb breakdowns. Farmers rarely 
see advanced cases of bTb and can therefore rely on few physical characteristics. 
Instead, they associate bTb incidents with the periods when cattle may be under stress: 
“All the youngsters, generally all the youngsters and it's I think part of it is stress 
of they've just come back from the other farm, they've just had a calf, they are 
under stress, aren't they?  Whereas the old cows seem to have built up 
immunity”. 
Alternatively, farmers may suggest a genetic link between some cattle and bTb, such 
that bTb may run through lines of cattle. For these cattle, there is a sense that bTb is 
unavoidable. For example:  
 “you will lose certain families...In this last test we had 3 daughters of 1 cow are 
on the inconclusive list. 
 
Secondly, farmers may try to predict who is likely to go down with bTb based on the way 
neighbours farm. This may relate to management practices, such as where people 
source replacement stock. Alternatively, farming ability is a key part of the candidate 
system: “hobby farmers”, for example, are believed by many other farmers to not have 
sufficent knowledge to farm properly:  
“One neighbour down there he just buys in from an old dealer and I wouldn't want 
anything that came off there” 
 
“[you get] the sort of hobby farmer…who really don't have a clue, they don't know 
about any of these things, they think you have the cow, stick it in a field and that's 
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it... they wonder why they can't hire in bulls any more and you say well because 
it's a bit of disease risk.  Is that so they say, you know?” 
 
Other candidates include: dairy cattle because they spend longer on farms; intensive 
farming systems because of the stress they put their cattle under; and management 
styles such as the New Zealand system where cattle are out all year round. This is seen 
as a risk because cattle are under stress, not eating properly and therefore likely to eat 
“infected” grass. For example:  
“Well the thing is these cows graze that tight and the whole system is based on 
grass, they sit and wait for the grass to grow and so you are going to get such 
a… a lot of my cows wouldn't… my cows where a badger had been they are that 
fussy they most probably wouldn't graze because we feed them with a mix every 
day of the year so they are never hungry-hungry, but these cows have to eat 
grass and that's why” 
Similarly, growing maize is a contested issue amongst farmers because it attracts 
badgers to feed off. Some farmers blame others for bTb breakdowns according to how 
and where they grow maize. For example: 
“my neighbour went down with his pedigree Hereford’s – he doesn’t grow any 
maize on the farm except he put a game strip [of maize] right above a field right 
by his house which runs right along the top of two of his buildings… The cattle 
grazed against it and ran right up to his buildings.  He went down with a massive 
amount [of bTb because] his badgers… travelled to him for his maize.  So I look 
at him and think good God he is smoking 60 fags a day by doing that - how 
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stupid! But that's a bit like telling somebody in the 50s that smoking was bad for 
you”. 
 
Thirdly, the candidate system is used to assess one’s own risk. In this, farmers may 
assess their risk status as high if they have a ‘flying herd’ and if they show cattle (herds 
that mainly purchase replacement stock are known as ‘flying herds’). For example:  
“what worries me is the fact that I buy cattle in to finish, if I’m buying them from 12 
months old they will be here until 30 months, so they are here quite a long time, 
it's the fact that I am susceptible to buying in… I'm a big risk factor because I’m 
buying in where I don't necessarily; I don't know necessarily where they come 
from. I will know from their passport and everything after I've bought them in 
auction but I don't know before” 
 
Farmers also talk about the geography of their farm as being a factor in going down with 
bTb. Particular fields are said to be ‘dodgy’ or safe; farms either side of natural 
boundaries are said to be susceptible to bTb or not; and land type also seems to be a 
factor for some. Finally, farmers point to particular types of badgers and their behaviours 
as suggesting that a particular farm is at risk. Farmers’ characterise the badger as a 
particularly intelligent and tough animal, one which many have respect for. At the same 
time, these characteristics mean that no biosecurity measures could ever separate them 
from their cattle. A sure sign of an imminent bTb breakdown is spotting so-called “rogue 
badgers” wandering around during the day or finding badgers in cattle sheds. Some 
farmers will suggest that badgers living in particular setts are those that are infected, 
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and target those for (illegal) eradication. The same farmers might also point to sudden 
localised declines in badger populations as a signifier of bTb infection within the badger 
population which also alerts them to dangers of new badgers moving in to the area. 
Either way, farms in these areas are at risk from going down with bTb. Alternatively, 
other farmers will suggest that badgers on their land must be “clean” because they have 
yet to suffer a bTb breakdown. For these farmers, the last thing they would countenance 
is any illegal removal of the badgers. To do so would disrupt badgers’ social territories, 
allowing new and potentially infected badgers onto their farm. Farmers, though, who 
have “taken matters into their own hands” and encouraged perturbation will have their 
breakdowns explained by their actions: 
“we had a spell when all the farms that belong to that Valley went down, what 
happened some silly sod up the Valley out of frustration put slurry down a sett 
and all he did was move all those badgers on and infected everybody else”  
 
Luck and fatalism 
 
The population approach follows similar top-down scientific styles of communication in 
which the public – in this case farmers – are presumed to be deficient in knowledge and 
need educating (Wynne, 1991). However, the candidate system highlights the range of 
factors farmers associate with incidents of bTb, but also their knowledge of potential 
adaptive behaviour. This research shows that in many cases, farmers are aware of 
many of the risk factors associated with bTb. Nevertheless, this knowledge does not 
encourage changed animal health practices. This is because just like the use of the 
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candidate system to explain human disease, farmers recognise the system to be fallible. 
Indeed, if there is one thing that characterises farmers’ understandings of bTb, it is that 
there is not much they can do about – it is purely down to luck. The importance of luck 
originates in all the exceptions to the biosecurity rules advanced within the population 
approach that farmers experience. The common example is the ‘closed herd’ (a herd 
that breeds its own replacement stock is known as a ‘closed herd’). According to the 
general risk factors within Defra’s advice, closed herds are less likely to suffer from bTb. 
Farmers though will point to numerous examples of closed herds suffering from bTb 
breakdowns to demonstrate that it offers few guarantees: 
“My cousin has a closed herd – it has been completely closed for 20 years now, 
they are good farmers, but they have spent thousands of pounds over the last 
nine years because of TB. It throws cattle to cattle transmission out of the 
window” 
 
The use of the closed herd also offers a good example of the importance of 
understanding the cultural significance of biosecurity language. Firstly, for many 
farmers, the concept of biosecurity is associated with highly intensive, factory farming. 
The idea of trying to turn the farm into a “Colditz”-like fortress, whilst not only impossible, 
was also contrary to their aim of farming to preserve a particular kind of landscape and 
husbandry (cf. Silvasti, 2003). These cultural connotations of biosecurity, combined with 
these styles of farming led to the rejection of biosecurity, but also link back to concepts 
of luck and fatalism to reinforce the legitimacy of traditional management techniques.  
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Secondly, scientists propose a binary classification of either closed or flying herds, but 
argue that farmers ‘claim to have a closed herd, but they simply do not exist’ (Bourne in 
Defra, 2004a: 14). This misunderstands the meaning farmers imply to a closed herd. 
Farmers refer to the closed herd as a fluid entitity, rather than the binary terms 
envisaged by scientists. Thus, whilst some farmers will claim definitively that they have a 
closed herd, others will describe themselves as “nearly closed” or “90% closed”. What 
they refer to here is the process of becoming a closed herd, a process which is a valid 
state, and not one equivalent to routinely buying in replacement stock (i.e. a flying herd). 
In this, farmers will also recognise that maintaining a closed herd is difficult and there 
may be times which require emergency restocking (e.g. if a calf dies) or to help manage 
the characteristics of the herd (e.g. bringing in a new bull). Neither situation 
compromises the status of the closed herd because it is constantly in the making. This 
more finely grained classification of herds therefore points to the need for a different 
language. One which imparts only binary classifications would seem, in this case, liable 
to be misunderstood.  
 
The uncertainties provided by a closed herd reinforce farmers’ views that contracting 
bTb is a matter of luck. Luck is also generated by observations of unwanted and 
unwarranted cases of bTb. Thus, farmers judged to be excellent by their peers are just 
as likely to suffer from bTb as those judged as poor. Equally, it is those “high risk 
farmers” (farming’s equivalent of ‘Uncle Norman’) that never suffer bTb whilst the “good 
ones” (equivalent to human health fanatics) do: 
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“This bloke is buying them all the time and he has never gone down and he has 
bought from TB infected herds or herds that have passed the test to be sold.  He 
has bought them there, takes them home and he has never had one go down.  
So no, I don't think anybody can be blamed for getting TB.”  
 
There are unwarranted and unwanted exceptions within cattle too: where it seems likely 
that cattle-to-cattle transmission should have occurred, farmers often point to these 
cases to show that the theories of cattle-to-cattle transmission within the population 
approach provide no guarantees or can be trusted. For example:  
“you cannot have this heifer spewing TB, I mean like they told us to go to the 
doctors. She was so bad we had her shot on the farm.  Something like that fair 
enough, she will pass it about and we know – but she hadn't done though and 
she was in with [all the other] cows” 
 
This meeting of the spatial logic of the population approach and farmers’ experienced 
reality of official attempts to control bTb therefore inspires a sense of fatalism. For many 
farmers, bTb is described as like a game of ‘Russian roulette’. Fatalism derives from the 
sense that bTb has become a way of life: it is no longer a surprise if they contract bTb 
and there is little motivation to do anything about it: 
“people have got to that point now that they think it’s continuous…you don’t get 
over it, it’s not like Foot and Mouth where you get it and then you’re clear and you 
don’t have it again. But with TB it’s a continuous thing that you’ve got that 6 
month period where you’re clear and then you’re down again”. 
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“it would be better if you were doing your biosecurity or doing things to prevent 
TB and they were working but what you do to prevent it doesn’t seem to really 
have any effect on what rate of TB you go down with.” 
 
Farmers therefore suggest bTb has become a way of life: it is as “common as catching a 
cold”, or “like a cancer that never goes away”. Some farmers become stressed by this: 
they see no way out, their business is tied up by restrictions and they commit desperate 
acts. This includes the illegal culling of badgers and even keeping valuable cattle in 
sheds all year round out of fear that they might contract bTb. Farmer suicide can 
accompany bTb breakdowns. Some farmers therefore help others to “take care of 
wildlife” – a euphemism for illegal badger culling – out of a concern for people and 
communities. Said one farmer: 
“Id rather someone shoots a badger than they shoot themselves, and that’s why 
I’ve done it for people…what I can tell you is this: that there might be somebody 
out there now that might be still here because of something I'd done and that's 
enough for anybody” 
 
These actions provide a feedback mechanism to the candidate system. Where farmers’ 
bTb problems have been resolved following badger culling, their cases are held up as 
examples of success – the ‘Uncle Normans’ of agriculture who contravene animal health 
advice yet whose situation somehow improves. The circulation of this knowledge within 
local agricultural communities reinforces their actions as legitimate. However, such 
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options are not open to all farmers. The illegality of badger culling obviously puts some 
farmers off. But those farms in isolated areas, away from the edge of nearby towns or 
areas with a high number of wildlife enthusiasts are more able to act upon these lay 
epidemiologies (cf. Neal and Walters, 2007).  
 
Other farmers respond to bTb by adapting their farming practices following a positive 
test: they are in a “state of readiness” to match their farming system to the demands of 
being under bTb movement restrictions. To prevent over-stocking, dairy farmers may 
begin shooting bull calves at birth and/or finish cattle for beef. Again, these are not 
options open to all farmers, neither are they adopted easily: they may run contrary to 
farmers’ own cultural sense of what constitutes good farming (Silvasti, 2003). However, 
the over-riding sense of fatalism does not drive them to implement new biosecurity 
measures: that would be just too open to chance. Even for those farmers who have 
constructed electric fences around badger setts, there is little sense of achievement. 
Their failure in combating bTb adds to the stories circulating in the farming community 
that feed the ecological paradox.  
 
Instead what farmers do is rely on their own lay epidemiologies and management 
practices. In practice that means illegal badger culling; missing or delaying bTb tests; 
and compromising existing biosecurity regulations, such as isolating bTb infected cattle 
before their slaughter. The decision of where to buy new cattle from is also structured by 
the reliance on lay epidemiologies. Farmers may be discouraged from buying from 
herds in low risk bTb areas because the stress of moving cattle long distances may 
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make them susceptible to bTb when they arrive in a high risk area. Equally, lay 
epidemiologies may encourage farmers to restock from areas with high bTb because of 
beliefs in immunity and susceptibility gained by cattle living in high risk areas: 
“you would be more likely to buy things closer to home from a local supplier off 
local farms because they are more likely to stay clear – you are likely to be better 
off. There seems to be greater immunity to the local cattle to ones from other 
parts of the country” 
 
These lay epidemiologies and the dominance of fatalism mean that there seems little 
point in adopting new biosecurity practices. It should be recognised that other factors 
also drive this behaviour, but they are not unconnected to the problems of the population 
approach. In particular, farmers have low levels of trust in Defra. This originates in the 
perceived mis-handling of recent agricultural crises (such as Foot and Mouth, and the 
problems over the establishment of the Rural Payments Agency). But in relation to bTb, 
the loss of trust stems from farmers’ experiences of Defra and the ISG’s experiment to 
assess the role of badgers in the epidemiology of bTb. In following the experiments, the 
social and political construction of science was made obvious to farmers. Firstly, the 
government made it clear from the outset that a policy of widespread badger culling 
would not be acceptable (ISG, 2007). Secondly, farmers within the trial areas suggested 
that the culling trial had been extremely inefficient (EFRA, 2006). Thirdly, farmers 
claimed that they were simultaneously told in public meetings organised by the scientists 
that the trial would require all badgers to be eliminated in some trial areas but that 
complete elimination would be impossible to achieve (cf. Wynne, 1992).  
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Farmers interviewed in and around the trial areas were therefore ambivalent to its 
results. For them, it was undermined from the start and worked for conservation rather 
than agricultural interests. This was symptomatic of a rural politics that viewed the 
countryside as under attack from urban values by “people sitting in London who know 
little about the reality of farming” (cf. Bickerstaff et al, 2006). These criticisms are also 
relevant to the practice of the population approach. Firstly, it shows how styles of 
reasoning conjoin political ideologies and spatial identities (cf. Bickerstaff and Simmons, 
2004). Secondly, it reveals how lay epidemiologies are developed not just in relation to 
the communication of health advice, but through observations of the ways and terms by 
which those data that underpin the population approach’s prescriptions are collected. In 
fact the perturbation effect – deemed to undermine the utility of badger culling by the 
ISG – has long been part of farming folklore through farmers own situated observations 
of badger behaviour. As demonstrated above, farmers use the candidate system for 
badgers too: those that look healthy and live on bTb-free farms are actively protected by 
farmers because of the deterrent these ‘healthy’ badgers serve to those infected with 
bTb. That this understanding became scientifically codified as ‘perturbation’ merely 
undermined the epidemiological basis of the population approach: it reinforced the view 
that the scientists did not do their job properly – they simply killed the “wrong” badgers – 
the “healthy” ones – leading to the spread of disease. That is, unlike farmers’ 
understandings, their approach was neither situated, contingent nor specific (cf. Wynne, 
1992).  
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Conclusion 
 
Farmers are fatalistic about disease because the apparent biosecurity certainties on 
offer are contrasted by a ‘fundamental gap which exists between a person’s experience 
of a given reality and science’s explanation of that same reality’ (Gifford, 1986). This gap 
can be traced to a clash of spatial logics inherent within the population approach and 
farmers’ understandings of animal health. Farmers’ own experiences of bTb tell them 
biosecurity solutions will not work; these conclusions are sustained by farmers’ social 
environment and the stories of bTb candidates that circulate within farming communities; 
and finally their previous experience of dealing with Defra tells them not to trust them. 
These findings highlight the need for animal health experts and policy makers to engage 
with farmers’ cultural and geographical understandings of animal disease when thinking 
about the promotion of biosecurity. In doing so, this engagement may firstly provide an 
opportunity for policy makers to reflexively think about the limitations of their proposed 
solutions. Secondly, engaging with these cultural understandings of biosecurity has 
important implications for the communication of biosecurity advice. To date, Defra has 
sought to promote enhanced farm biosecurity using leaflets containing general animal 
health messages. These findings, however, suggest that such efforts may reinforce 
traditionally held views of disease control and, ironically, adversely affect animal health. 
This then is the ‘ecological paradox’ in action: a paradox because policy achieves the 
wrong ends; ecological because it affects both social and natural populations; and 
geographical because it involves different spatial logics of understanding animal health. 
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These findings raise two important questions.  Firstly, if these conundrums to health 
promotion were already appreciated in relation to human health, why proceed with a 
population approach? One answer may lie in the way in which Defra framed the solution 
to bTb and its commitment to solutions based on “sound science” (Defra, 2005a). Yet, in 
determining the definition of “sound science”, it seems the potential contribution of social 
science was ignored. Whilst Defra have always insisted that any new bTb policies would 
have to be socially acceptable, this seems to be where any concern for “the social” 
begins and ends. For example, between 1996-2006, Defra spent approximately 
£70million on research into bTb. Only 0.1% of this was spent on social research. 
Similarly, a review of the evidence for bovine Tuberculosis commissioned by Defra’s 
Science Advisory Council failed to include socio-economic research within its terms of 
reference (SAC, 2005). More recently Defra’s Science Advisory Council (2007) have 
sought to enhance the role of social science within policy making. However, for bTb 
these recommendations are too late: its absence has meant that bTb policy is framed 
uniquely as a scientific and/or veterinary problem. In doing so, a range of social and 
cultural aspects of illness and disease are ignored. Such a scenario is not unusual. A 
review of the academic journals dealing with animal disease control reveals that social 
and cultural factors are rarely or only briefly discussed (see for example Lindberg and 
Houe, 2005).  
 
Alternatively, the absence of social science may be related to organisational failings, 
specifically the failure to promote integrated working practices. Elsewhere in Defra, the 
social sciences have played an important role in helping to design policies and 
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strategies to influence pro-environmental behaviour (Defra, 2004b, 2006a,b). Thus, the 
styles of reasoning associated with animal health problems may have contributed to a 
set of ‘institutional logics’ (March and Olsen, 1992) within Defra that lock traditional 
approaches and disciplines to solutions (cf. Ward et al, 2004). It may take some radical 
re-organisation of structures and institutions if these challenges to the social 
organisation of risk management are to be avoided, but it may also begin to address the 
corrosive loss of trust between farmers and government. Government attempts to 
change behaviour and develop ‘ownership’ of bTb through encouragement rather than 
regulation therefore require greater recourse to social science, to highlight both 
problems and opportunities – a call to which human geographers are ideally placed to 
respond (see Herrick [2007] for a similar argument in relation to public health). 
 
Secondly, if biosecurity remains a worthwhile endeavour, how is it possible to encourage 
farmers to adopt biosecurity? Even with fairly reliable technologies, agricultural 
sociologists have shown how cultures of farming make technology transfer a difficult 
task (Vanclay, 2004). For biosecurity, this is made more difficult because all aspects are 
precautionary and some have little or no scientific proof that they “work”. In fact, proving 
that biosecurity “works” is incredibly difficult, particularly with a multi-factorial disease like 
bTb. With Defra saying that policy should be based on “sound science”, the lack of 
scientific knowledge on the effectiveness of biosecurity suggests that its popularisation 
may be a form of discursive ‘pollution’ serving to amplify the risks associated with bTb 
(Hilgartner, 1990). Perhaps it would be better not to speak of biosecurity at all, at least 
not in the terms Defra have adopted?  
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It would also be wrong to rely only on “sound science”, even if it existed for biosecurity. 
Instead, as this paper argues, the problem relates more to developing the cultural 
conditions in which farmers can constructively learn and apply biosecurity. In many ways 
it is pointless recommending biosecurity if farmers cannot afford it or have limited 
support to personally advise them (cf. Pannell et al, 2006). What studies from the 
sociology of health and agriculture have shown is that behavioural change initiatives are 
more likely to succeed by working with rather than against popular culture (Backett and 
Davison, 1992). What this means is acknowledging the importance of the socialisation of 
health (Davison et al, 1991). The candidate system that farmers create does recognise 
the risk factors that are also identified within scientific discourses. There are some 
biosecurity activities that farmers do implement from which they create their own codes 
of appropriate behaviour (e.g. not putting mineral blocks out, not feeding on the floor 
etc.) although by no means do all farmers subscribe to these and in all cases it is 
mediated by local experience and observation. In this way, the candidate system does 
not merely operate as a means to propagate a set of rural myths. Rather, the challenge 
lies in working with these cultural understandings of disease to help understand how 
biosecurity can achieve cultural currency within the farming community. Why some 
aspects of biosecurity have already achieved this is unclear: the ignorance of social 
research within bTb policy has meant that this is unknown.  
 
The reluctance to take social research seriously, learn from other social theories of 
health promotion and include it within definitions of “sound science” has meant – despite 
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any best intentions – the implicit promotion of the ecological paradox. There are a 
number of other ways of promoting animal health. The development of social learning to 
encourage the appropriate conditions for farmers to establish their own solutions may 
offer some hope (Röling and Wagemakers, 1998). Such methods have been used to 
help promote agricultural efficiency but not, it seems, address bTb. Thus, if Defra are 
serious about encouraging ‘ownership’ of bTb amongst the farming community, then it is 
these social aspects of disease control that need to be understood and evaluated. 
However, for as long as bTb is framed as a uniquely veterinary or scientific problem and 
fails to engage with the social understanding of bTb the consequences for cattle, 
farmers and badgers will be severe. 
 
                                                          
Notes 
 
1
 Animal Health (formerly known as the State Veterinary Service) is the UK Government’s agency responsible for 
the delivery of bTb policy. It determines the frequency of bTb testing for individual farm parishes by assigning each 
a parish testing interval (PTI). These intervals can range from one to four years but farms within high risk areas may 
expect to test more regularly, either due to bTb incidence on their own farms, as a result of neighbouring farms 
contracting bTb, or as a result of cattle tracings – where cattle have been moved from one herd which subsequently 
contracts bTb, cattle may be retested at their new location to prevent transmission within that herd. The farms that 
participated in this research were all in annual parish testing intervals. 
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